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WISCONSIN’S ANTITRUST LAW:
OUTSOURCING THE LEGAL STANDARD
MICHAEL P. WAXMAN
Since its first commentary about the Wisconsin Antitrust Act (Pulp
Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604, 147 N.W. 1058
((1914)) the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has regularly reiterated its
policy that interpretations of the Act must follow absolutely “federal
[antitrust] decisions.” This policy is driven neither by federal preemption
nor by state legislative enactment or pronouncement. The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin’s commentaries on this policy for almost a century since the
Pulp Wood decision have provided very little counsel to state courts much
less businesspersons and their legal advisors. Indeed, one may still
reasonably ask whether “federal decisions” includes judicial decisions by
all federal courts wherever situated and all federal agencies deciding
cases, administering rules and providing “guidelines” applying “federal
[antitrust] law.” Moreover, the Court has not even provided guidance as
to how to resolve conflicts in the application of “federal decisions.”
In an age of “activist” federal courts and administrative agencies that
have upended traditional concepts and decisions of federal antitrust law, it
is very important that generalized policies applying lockstep application
of “federal decisions” be jettisoned and replaced by reasoned judicial
decisions applying Wisconsin antitrust law. Of course, where appropriate,
Wisconsin courts may choose to follow federal decisions (whatever that
term means) and thereby assure that Wisconsin antitrust law comports
with an overall federal antitrust design. Yet, by replacing the current
inflexible policy with legal analysis that best suits the interests and needs
of Wisconsin’s citizenry Wisconsin courts may effectively steer a course
that avoids the antitrust activism that roils the federal courts and federal
administrative agencies and thereby provide security in long term judicial
interpretations.

 Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I appreciate greatly the
assistance of my research assistants: Alexander Bouthilet, Sumeeta Krishnaney, Elizabeth
Odian, Benjamin Schwall, and Joy Weber. Their diligence and creativity in the development
of this article was invaluable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1

The Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) was passed in 1890. The
Sherman Act declares as illegal anticompetitive acts involving contracts,
2
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade and monopolization
3
and attempts to monopolize. By writing the Sherman Act using general
terms rather than supplying a “laundry list” of anticompetitive activities,
Congress chose to leave the determination of illegality to the federal
4
courts and eventually to government agencies. Within a few years,
many states passed their own antitrust laws. Some states (including
5
Wisconsin) adopted language similar to the Sherman Act.
Since the enactment of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act over a century
6
ago, Wisconsin courts have consistently declared that state court
interpretations of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act are governed by federal
7
decisions construing the Sherman Act. Although it is necessary to
coordinate federal and state antitrust law to avoid a disjointed and
conflicting system of enforcement, the judicially created policy that
Wisconsin courts must follow in lockstep with federal decisions
construing the Sherman Act has never received support from the state
legislature and may be disadvantageous to the best interests of the state.
Indeed, while the Wisconsin legislature has neither addressed the
relationship between the state and federal acts nor directed the
Wisconsin courts to slavishly follow federal decisions construing the
Sherman Act, the state legislature did direct that Wisconsin’s antitrust
law “[be given] the most liberal construction to achieve the aim of
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006).
2. Id. § 1.
3. Id. § 2.
4. See infra notes 19–20.
5. WIS. STAT. § 133.03 (2009–2010); see also Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber
Co., 157 Wis. 604, 625, 147 N.W. 1058, 1066 (1914).
Section 1747e, Stats. of Wisconsin, is a copy of the federal statute . . . . It
originally appeared as Chapter 319, Laws of 1893. Since then it has
received substantially the same construction, sub silentio at least, that was
placed on the federal law . . . . If the above statute has any application to
the facts in this case, it should receive the same interpretation that was
placed on the federal act, from which it was taken, by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Id.
6. Law of April 17, 1893, ch. 219, 1893 Wis. Laws ch. 219, 264–67 (current version at
WIS. STAT. §§ 133.01–18); see also State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 715–16,
144 N.W.2d 1, 9 (1966).
7. See infra note 29.
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8

competition.” Despite the Wisconsin legislature’s direction, Wisconsin
Supreme Court decisions have clearly and strongly stated that since the
wording of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act follows so closely that of the
Sherman Act, the intent of the drafters of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act
was that the Wisconsin courts doggedly follow federal decisions
9
construing the Sherman Act.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s election to strictly follow
federal decisions has been clear and consistent, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has failed to address several important issues that are essential for
effective application of the law. For example, beyond the similarity of
language used in the Wisconsin Antitrust Act and the Sherman Act,
what rationale is there for this lockstep approach? Since neither the
Sherman Act itself nor federal decisions declare that federal antitrust
law preempts state antitrust law there is no mandatory external
requirement that the state law absolutely follow federal decisions
10
construing the Sherman Act. In fact, over the years, legal scholars and
practitioners have expressed a strong sentiment in favor of continuing a
dual system of federal and state antitrust law enforcement with active
11
enforcement of state laws. Based on these factors it seems incongruous
for state law to be so absolutely tethered to federal interpretations of
the Sherman Act. Indeed, considering that many state antitrust laws

8. WIS. STAT. § 133.01.
9. See discussion infra Part II.B.
10. State v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 295, 101 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1960).
“There is no language in the federal enactments that pre-empts the field of regulation and
enforcement in the federal government or that precludes the states from enacting effective
legislation dealing with such unlawful practices.” Id.
11. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. HOUCK, TRANSITION REPORT, THE STATE OF STATE
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 5–6 (2009), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null?&
exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=153771&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3DTRANSITI
ON%20REPORT.pdf; Joseph P. Bauer, Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing the
Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 303, 322
(stating that state antitrust law and enforcement are needed to reach anticompetitive
intrastate conduct and those cases the federal government are unwilling to pursue); Robert F.
Roach, Bank Mergers and the Antitrust Laws: The Case for Dual State and Federal
Enforcement, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95, 145 (1994). But cf. Donald L. Flexner & Mark A.
Racanelli, State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the United States: Collision or
Harmony?, 9 CONN. J. INT’L L. 501, 532 (1994) (expressing concern that dual enforcement
will “lead to competition among the states to create the most restrictive antitrust policy
against takeovers as a means of encouraging companies to locate or incorporate in that
state.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 413, 425
(1983); Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State
Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 12–13 (2004) (weighing pros and cons of state
antitrust law enforcement).
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apply to both interstate and intrastate commerce, why would these
scholars encourage state antitrust law enforcement if the result will only
be to give the same applications as that given by federal courts and
federal government agencies under the Sherman Act? Therefore,
although it is important that there be some level of consistency between
interpretations of federal and state antitrust law, there is neither a
compulsion nor an expectation that the Wisconsin Antitrust Act be read
in lockstep with the Sherman Act.
An additional problem is which federal antitrust laws and federal
decisions must the Wisconsin courts follow? If the basis for looking to
federal decision-making is due to the similarity of language in the
13
Sherman Antitrust Act and the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, are the
Wisconsin courts not bound by federal decisions based on other federal
14
antitrust laws such as the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade
15
Also, to which decision-making bodies are
Commission Act?
Wisconsin courts bound? For example, after the mid-twentieth century
the Wisconsin Supreme Court shifted from a command to follow the
United States Supreme Court interpretations of the Sherman Act to one
that directs Wisconsin courts to follow the interpretations of “federal
16
decisions.”
An examination of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s rationale for its
policy to abjectly follow federal decisions construing federal antitrust
law and the problems that it creates is long overdue. This article will
address, first, the development of the judicial requirement that the
Wisconsin Antitrust Act unquestioningly follow federal decisions
construing “federal law.” Next, this article will examine significant
substantive and procedural issues that arise due to the absolute binding
of Wisconsin Antitrust Act to the Sherman Act. Finally, alternative
ways will be recommended to address the need for independence when
12. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has clearly declared that the Wisconsin Antitrust Act
applies to both interstate and intrastate commerce. See Meyers v. Bayer, A.G., 2007 WI 99,
¶3, 303 Wis. 2d 295, 300, 735 N.W.2d 448, 451; Olstad v. Microsoft Corp., 2005 WI 121, ¶ 1,
284 Wis. 2d 224, 229, 700 N.W.2d 139, 141.
13. See infra note 34.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
15. Id. § 45.
16. Beginning with the Pulp Wood case in 1914 the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited the
United States Supreme Court interpretations of the Sherman Act as the source for
interpretations of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act. However, in State v. Lewis & Leidersdorf Co.,
201 Wis. 543, 549, 230 N.W. 692, 694 (1930), the Wisconsin Supreme Court changed its source
for interpreting the Wisconsin Antitrust Act to the “federal decisions.” This shift in the
source of interpretation has remained fairly constant since then. See infra notes 28–29.
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Wisconsin courts interpret the Wisconsin Antitrust Act while keeping
the state and federal antitrust law in concert.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WISCONSIN ANTITRUST LAW
A. The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act focuses primarily on two areas of
“anticompetitive” practices: Section 1 addresses agreements by two or
more parties who act through a contract, combination, or conspiracy to
coordinate practices that would harm competition, and Section 2
17
addresses acts of monopolization that would harm competition.
Recognizing the ingenuity of business people and lawyers to circumvent
any specific list of anticompetitive practices and the potential advances
in the science of economics, Congress wrote the Sherman Act
prohibitions in a general form to permit the courts to address
18
anticompetitive practices as they arise. Despite Congressional actions
over time to supplement the Sherman Act with more specific additional
sections and significant increases in the penalties for violations, Sherman
Act sections one and two have remained general in form.
In the twentieth century, Congress supplemented the judicial powers
under the Sherman Act to interpret what constitutes anticompetitive
practices by creating administrative agencies and endowing them with
the responsibility and power to address anticompetitive practices. For
example, Congress created the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 and
gave it powers beyond the Sherman Act to address possible
anticompetitive acts under the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal
Trade Commission Act through the broader language of “unfair
19
methods of competition.” By the latter part of the twentieth century,
federal government agencies were propounding interpretations of
20
federal antitrust law through rules and guidelines. Finally, Congress
provided state attorneys general and private parties with both the power

17. See supra notes 2 & 3.
18. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 530–31
(1983) (stating that the Sherman Act’s legislative history supported broad construction of the
statute); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 550 (1978) (noting that the
language of § 3(b) is broad and unqualified, and if Congress intended certain limitation, it
would have done so explicitly).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
20. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.
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to enforce the Sherman Act as well as incentives for these private
parties to act as “private attorneys general” by giving successful
plaintiffs the ability to recover treble damages, court costs, and
21
reasonable attorney’s fees.
In the modern era, taking their cue from Congress, the federal courts
and administrative agencies have applied their interpretations of
economic and social policies to determine what constitutes an
anticompetitive activity. However, because there are several quite
divergent economic theories for many antitrust issues, federal judges
have sometimes used economic theories that suit their beliefs as the
22
basis for their decisions. As a result of this diversity of economic
thought, many United States Supreme Court and lower federal
appellate court decisions have been decided by a bare majority of votes.
Also, federal agency decisions, rules, and policies are subject to the
political leanings of the executive branch and Congress.
B. Wisconsin Antitrust Law
23

In 1893 Wisconsin passed its own antitrust law and adopted
24
language for its antitrust act that is very similar to the Sherman Act.
Although the state legislature probably used the Sherman Act as a
25
template for the creation of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, the
legislature has never restricted the interpretation and application of the
26
Wisconsin Antitrust Act to that of the federal antitrust law. Yet, as
early as 1914, the Wisconsin Supreme Court commanded that state
court interpretations of the Wisconsin antitrust law must follow the
21. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a); see 2007 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION: REPORT
RECOMMENDATIONS 189–190 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/
report_recommendation/toc.htm [hereinafter Antitrust Modernization].
The Antitrust
Modernization Commission is a product of the Antitrust Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107–273, § 11052, 116 Stat. 1856 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1).
22. See infra note 61.
23. Law of April 17, 1893, ch. 219, 1893 Wis. Laws ch. 219, 264–67 (current version at
WIS. STAT. §§ 133.01–18 (2009–2010)).
24. The antitrust act was restated in WIS. STAT. § 1747 (1898). The Wisconsin Antitrust
Act was completely restructured in 1979. See 1979 Wis. Laws 209, § 2 (enacted). Although
the revised act specifically permitted indirect purchaser claims for the most part, the language
and substance of the act and the Wisconsin Supreme Court views as to its application
remained substantially the same.
25. See Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604, 625, 147 N.W.
1058, 1066 (1914). For subsequent reiterations of this view, see, for example, Patti-Marshall,
LLC v. Four Winds Subdivision, LLC, No. 2009AP2741, 2010 Wisc. App. LEXIS 710, at *5
n.4 .
26. See Olstad v. Microsoft Corp., 2005 WI 121, ¶ 55, 284 Wis. 2d 224, 700 N.W. 2d 139.
AND
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Supreme Court of the United States interpretations of the federal law.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court regularly repeated this dogmatic order to
follow the United States Supreme Court until the mid-twentieth
28
century.
However, since then the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
altered its direction and fairly consistently stated that the Wisconsin
29
courts must follow “federal decisions” that interpret federal law.
Directed to follow federal decisions absolutely, Wisconsin courts face
some major quandaries: does the Wisconsin Supreme Court mean all
federal bodies construing federal law? What happens when federal
decisions are in conflict? Must the Wisconsin courts follow the
hierarchy of the federal courts? What about decisions by federal
agencies and federal agency rules and guidelines? The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has never removed any of these stumbling blocks to
provide effective guidance as to the application of “federal decisions”
construing federal law.
Indeed, although the Wisconsin courts have decided numerous
antitrust cases over the past century, and the number of decisions have
increased markedly over the past quarter century, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s doctrine requiring a lockstep approach to remain in
strict concert with “federal decisions” construing “federal law” has not
varied. The court has declared that the interpretations and applications
30
of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act are “ruled by” federal law. Although
the Wisconsin courts have expressed the wording in different ways the
concept that federal decisions interpreting federal law controls the
interpretation and application of state antitrust law has always been

27. See Pulp Wood Co., 157 Wis. at 625, 147 N.W. at 1066; see also Henry G. Meigs, Inc.
v. Empire Petroleum Co., 273 F.2d 424, 430 (7th Cir. 1960) (explaining that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court followed the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law);
State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 716, 144 N.W.2d 1, 9 (1966).
28. For a case reiterating the requirement that the Wisconsin courts follow the
interpretations of the Supreme Court of the United States, see Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31
Wis. 2d at 716, 144 N.W.2d at 9. “This court, however, in 1914, pointed out that sec. 1747e
was taken from the Sherman Act and should receive the same interpretation as that which
was placed in the federal act by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id.
29. Note the shift in the cases declaring that the state courts look to “federal court
decisions” or “federal decisions.” See Reese v. Assoc. Hosp. Serv., Inc., 45 Wis. 2d 526, 532,
173 N.W.2d 661, 664 (1970); John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 198
N.W.2d 363, 367–68 (1972); State ex rel Nordell v. Kinney, 62 Wis. 2d 558, 563, 215 N.W.2d
405, 407 (1974); City of Madison v. Hyland, Hall and Co., 73 Wis. 2d 364, 375, 243 N.W.2d
422, 428 (1976); State v. Waste Mgmt. of Wisconsin, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 555, 569 n.12, 261 N.W.2d
147, 153 n.12 (1978); Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 346, 294 N.W.2d 473, 480 (1980).
30. See State v. Lewis & Leidersdorf Co., 201 Wis. 543, 549, 230 N.W. 692, 694 (1930);
see also Reese, 45 Wis. 2d at 532, 173 N.W.2d at 664.
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31

maintained.
In addition, a major question arises as to which federal bodies the
Wisconsin courts are referring by using the term “federal decision.”
Beginning with the Pulp Wood case in 1914 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court cited the United States Supreme Court as the source for
32
interpretations of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act.
However, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court changed its source for interpreting the
33
Wisconsin Antitrust Act to “federal decisions.” This shift in the source
34
of interpretation has remained fairly constant since then.
The rationale given for this long-term policy of lockstep following of
federal court interpretations is that since the wording of the Wisconsin
Antitrust Act follows closely that of the Sherman Act, the intent of the
legislature must have been to follow the federal court interpretations
35
absolutely.
Yet, despite the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s regular
assertions of this policy, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has referred only
once in the state’s antitrust cases as to the intent of the Wisconsin

31. See Nordell, 62 Wis. at 563, 215 N.W.2d at 407. For cases interpreted “consistently
with” federal law see Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d at 716, 144 N.W.2d at 10. For cases
“controlled by” federal law see Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 176 Wis. 2d 714, 724, 500
N.W.2d 658, 662 (1993); Grams, 97 Wis. 2d at 346, 294 N.W.2d at 480; Waste Mgmt. of
Wisconsin, 81 Wis. 2d at 569, 261 N.W.2d at 153; John Mohr & Sons, Inc., 55 Wis. 2d at 410,
198 N.W.2d at 367–68; Am. Med. Transp. of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Curtis-Universal, Inc., 148 Wis.
2d 294, 299, 435 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Ct. App. 1988). For cases that “conform with” federal law
see Conley Publ’g Group, Ltd. v. Journal Comm., Inc., 2003 WI 119 ¶ 17, 265 Wis. 2d 128,
140, 665 N.W.2d 879, 885; In re Commitment of Tainter, 2002 WI App 296, ¶ 22, 259 Wis. 2d
387, 400, 655 N.W.2d 538, 544. For cases “adhering” to federal law see Carlson & Erickson
Builders v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 190 Wis. 2d 651, 662, 529 N.W.2d 905, 909 (1995). For cases
“governed by” federal law see Hyland, 73 Wis. 2d at 375, 243 N.W.2d at 428. For cases stating
that federal law is the “law of the land” see Pulp Wood Co., 157 Wis. at 619, 147 N.W. at 1064.
This has been reiterated in Slowiak v. Hudson Foods, No. 91-C-737, WL 176983, at *9 (W.D.
Wis. Apr. 8, 1992) aff’d on other grounds, 987 F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1993). But cf. Am. Med.
Transp., Inc. v. Curtis-Universal, Inc., 154 Wis. 2d 135, 145, 452 N.W.2d 575, 579 (1990).
32. See Pulp Wood, 157 Wis. at 619, 147 N.W. at 1064 (construing “restraint of trade” as “only
acts, contracts, agreements, or combinations which operate to the prejudice of the public
interests . . .”).

33. See supra note 29.
34. The only post 1970 exception to the shift from the United States Supreme Court
decisions to federal decisions was in Prentice, 76 Wis. 2d at 724, 500 N.W. at 662. Even then,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court returned to its “federal decisions” terminology in Carlson &
Erickson Builders, Inc. v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 190 Wis. 2d 650, 665, 529 N.W.2d 905, 910–11
(1995) (citing Madison v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis. 2d 364, 375, 243 N.W.2d 422, 428
(1976)).
35. Pulp Wood, 157 Wis. at 625, 147 N.W. at 1066; see Lewis & Leidersdorf Co., 201 Wis.
at 550, 230 N.W. at 695 (“Giving to Sec. 133 the same construction that has been given to
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act . . . , which we are required to do under the ruling of the
Pulp Wood case.”); see also Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d at 716, 144 N.W.2d at 10.
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legislature when addressing the relationship between Wisconsin’s
antitrust law and the Sherman Act. In Conley Publishing Group, Ltd. v.
36
Journal Communications, Inc., the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated,
Our adherence to federal antitrust precedent
supports important Wisconsin policies.
First and
foremost, when the Wisconsin legislature enacted the
state’s mini-Sherman Act, it intended for courts to
construe Chapter 133 consistent with the interpretations
37
provided for analogous federal laws. In Grams v. Boss
we explained:
‘We have repeatedly stated that section 133.01 . . .
was intended as a reenactment of the first two sections of
the federal Sherman Act of 1890 . . . with application to
intrastate commerce as distinguished from interstate
transactions [the restriction to intrastate commerce was
successfully challenged and was soundly rejected in
38
Olstad v. Microsoft Corp., ] and that the question of
what acts constitute a combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade is controlled by federal court decisions
under the Sherman Act.’
In the decades since that approach was adopted, we
have relied upon the legislature’s power to revise
Chapter 133 if Wisconsin court adherence to federal
39
antitrust doctrine is found to be objectionable.
The Conley statements and analysis quoted above suffers from
numerous faults. First, Grams was cited incorrectly in the Conley
decision, as the quoted portion of the opinion says nothing about courts
construing chapter 133 “consistent with” the Sherman Act. Rather than
as quoted in Conley, Grams described the relationship between chapter
133 and the Sherman Act as one where the state antitrust law is
40
“controlled by” the federal law. The legal linguistic difference between
“consistent with” and “controlled by” is quite significant when one
considers the room for difference between judicial interpretations of the
two acts. In fact, out of all the Wisconsin cases addressing the
Wisconsin Antitrust Act, only Milwaukee Braves, Inc. ever uses the term
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

2003 WI 119, 265 Wis. 2d 128, 665 N.W.2d 879.
97 Wis. 2d at 346, 294 N.W.2d at 480.
2005 WI 121, ¶ 1, 284 Wis. 2d 224, 229, 700 N.W.2d 139, 141.
Conley, 2003 WI 119, ¶ 18, 265 Wis. 2d 128, 665 N.W.2d 879.
Grams, 97 Wis. 2d. at 346, 294 N.W.2d at 480.
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41

“consistently with.” Indeed, the Conley case opinion seems well aware
of the absence of legislative support for its adamant demand that
Wisconsin court’s doggedly follow federal decisions construing federal
42
law. This is reflected in the Conley court’s weak assertion that the
legislature must have agreed with the court’s interpretation or the
legislature would change the law: “In the decades since this approach
was adopted, we have relied upon the legislature’s power to revise
Chapter 133 if Wisconsin court adherence to federal antitrust doctrine is
43
found to be objectionable.”
Second, when one considers the generality of the Sherman Act and
Chapter 133, it seems unlikely that the state legislature would get into
the business of specific redirection of the court’s unilateral historical
commandment. Despite the Conley court’s assertion that the legislature
“intended . . . courts to construe Chapter 133 consistent with the
44
interpretations provided for analogous federal law,” this claim appears
unsupported by any legislative history and does not define what
constitutes an interpretation provided by analogous federal law.
Indeed, considering the significant breadth of decision-making sources
to interpret federal (antitrust) law in the modern era (e.g. the Federal
Trade Commission was not established until 1914) and the conflicts in
economic interpretation of antitrust law that have evolved, it is highly
unlikely that the state legislature in 1893 contemplated the place of state
antitrust law in relation to federal antitrust law.
III. WHY DOES THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
FOLLOW FEDERAL LAW?
Considering the state of virtual internecine war over antitrust law
within the federal judiciary over the past thirty years and occasional
significant disputes between federal antitrust enforcement agencies over
the appropriate interpretations of federal antitrust law, a serious
examination must be made as to why the Wisconsin Supreme Court
continues to apply a doctrine of absolute adherence to federal decisions
construing the federal antitrust law.
There are two possible rationales that might explain why the
Wisconsin Supreme Court chose to follow federal decisions interpreting
federal antitrust law: first, if federal law preempted state antitrust law;
41.
42.
43.
44.

State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 716, 144 N.W.2d 1, 10 (1966).
Conley, 2003 WI 119, ¶ 18, 265 Wis. 2d 128, 665 N.W.2d 879.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id.

11. WAXMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

OUTSOURCING THE LEGAL STANDARD

8/13/2011 9:24 PM

1183

second, if the Wisconsin Antitrust Act and Wisconsin courts were
restricted only to consideration of cases involving intrastate commerce.
As for the former, since the passage of the Sherman Act, neither the
Congress of the United States nor the federal courts have attempted to
preempt the states in their creation and enforcement of state antitrust
45
law. As for the latter, although the federal and state courts initially
interpreted that state antitrust laws could be applied only to intrastate
46
commerce, eventually it was determined that state antitrust laws could
47
be applied to interstate commerce as well.
There is no federal preemption of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, and
state courts are not precluded from hearing disputes involving interstate
commerce. Thus, absent state legislative direction, state courts must
draw a fine line between becoming a haven for unnecessary conflict with
the federal courts and agencies and parroting federal antitrust law as
interpreted by the federal courts, thereby making the state law
superfluous. Considering the ability of a state to establish its own
antitrust law, state courts must constantly be vigilant to avoid the
extremes of antitrust thinking that may arise in the federal judiciary.
Such extreme shifts in law and economic policy from traditional and
well-developed antitrust standards may merely reflect questionable
economic theory over the realities in the market place and thereby
cause confusion in the business and consumer communities. To draw
45. See State v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 295, 101 N.W.2d 133, 135
(1960); see also California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101–102 (1989) (citing Watson v.
Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 403 (1941)); Standard Oil of Kentucky v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413, 422
(1910). See generally ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION, supra note 21, at 185; NAT’L ASS’N OF
ATTORNEYS GEN., RESOLUTION, PRINCIPLES OF STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1–3
(2005), available at http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/2005.Spring.Antitrust.Resolution.
Final.pdf.
46. Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 413 (5th Cir. 1962)
(holding that Texas’ antitrust statutes would not be applied to interstate activities); Kosuga v.
Kelly, 257 F.2d 48, 55 (7th Cir. 1958), aff’d 358 U.S. 516, 521 (1958) (holding that the
Antitrust Act of Illinois applied “only to intrastate commerce”); In re Wiring Device
Antitrust Litigation, 498 F. Supp. 79, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (“Where, as here, all defendants are
unquestionably engaged in interstate commerce, those who are damaged from an alleged
restraint of trade find a remedy in the federal, not the state, antitrust laws. This conclusion is
buttressed in this case by the longstanding holding of the South Carolina Supreme Court . . .
that the state antitrust statute . . . applies only to intrastate commerce and does not reach
interstate commerce of any kind.”); Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 346, 294 N.W.2d 473, 480
(1980); John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 198 N.W.2d 363, 367 (1972);
Reese v. Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc., 45 Wis. 2d 526, 532, 173 N.W.2d 661, 664 (1970).
47. See, e.g., Meyers v. Bayer, A.G., 2007 WI 99, ¶ 3, 303 Wis. 2d 295, 300, 735 N.W.2d
448, 451; and Olstad v. Microsoft Corp., 2005 WI 121, ¶ 1, 284 Wis. 2d 224, 229, 700 N.W.2d
139, 141; see also Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enter., Inc., 908 F.2d 477, 480 (9th Cir.
1990); St. Joe Paper Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 94, 95–6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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this line, a state legislature and a state court must ensure that there is
enough room for the state courts to exercise a fair bit of discretion as to
48
what constitutes an antitrust violation under the state’s law.
Several respected legal authorities have expressed the importance of
states having and enforcing antitrust laws that respect interpretations of
49
federal law by federal courts while states maintain their independence.
These authors have argued that this independence should not be merely
facial, but rather that different ways of thinking, particularly where
there are significant distinctions in legal thought, warrant an active state
antitrust voice. Assuming that state antitrust law should exist beyond
the ability to catch anticompetitive acts that do not fall into the coverage
of interstate commerce, it is important to examine the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s decision to follow an absolutist and unreflective path.
IV. WHAT DO THE TERMS “FEDERAL COURT” AND
“FEDERAL LAW” MEAN?
Because the Wisconsin Supreme Court directed that Wisconsin
50
courts must follow “federal decisions” construing “federal law” when
applying state antitrust law a primary problem is a definitional one—
what do federal decisions and federal law mean?
First, what does federal law mean? The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
rationale for its lockstep application of the federal law is that the
language used in the Wisconsin Antitrust Act and the Sherman Act is
very similar. The implication, according to the court, is that this is what
51
the legislature wanted. But, if one accepts the similarity of language
48. See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 493 So. 2d 1149, 1158
(La. 1986). The Supreme Court of Louisiana addressed the United States Supreme Court’s
adoption of the “single-entity defense” over the United States Supreme Court’s own previous
standard of the “intra-enterprise conspiracy” doctrine. The Louisiana court stated that
although the Louisiana statute is a counterpart to Section 1 of the Sherman Act and therefore
United States Supreme Court opinions are a persuasive influence on the interpretation of the
state’s act, the federal analysis is not controlling and especially so “where the relevant ruling
of the federal high court is a departure from their own well-established rule, and from a
prevailing decision” of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Id.; see also ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION, supra note 21, at 185.
49. See sources cited supra note 11.
50. See, e.g., City of Madison v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis. 2d 364, 375, 243 N.W.2d
422, 428 (1976); Reese, 45 Wis. 2d at 532, 173 N.W.2d at 664; State v. Lewis & Leidersdorf Co.,
201 Wis. 543, 549, 230 N.W. 692, 694 (1930). Some decisions by the Wisconsin courts have
added such phrases as “federal court decisions.” See Grams, 97 Wis. 2d at 346, 294 N.W.2d at
480; Am. Med. Transp. of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Curtis-Universal, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 294, 299, 435
N.W.2d 286, 289 (Ct. App. 1988).
51. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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argument then does the state law have any direction to include the
Clayton Antitrust Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act and other
“federal” antitrust related acts as part of federal law? Are federal
decisions based on these acts binding on Wisconsin courts?
Second, what does the term federal decision mean? The definitional
issue of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s use of the loose term federal
decision goes well beyond a semantic game.
This definitional
conundrum is particularly perplexing because the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has never provided guidance as to what federal courts and federal
administrative agencies are included in this term. Does it mean
decisions by any federal court or by only some of these courts (e.g. those
with direct powers such as the Eastern and Western Districts of
Wisconsin, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court)? How is prioritizing among the courts to be done (e.g.
does a federal appellate court decision in one circuit trump a federal
district court in another circuit)? What if two or more federal judicial
decisions are in conflict and the federal courts are on the same level?
Does the definition include federal government agency decisions (e.g.
Federal Trade Commission decisions)? Does the term federal decisions
include administrative rule-makings (e.g. Federal Trade Commission)
and federal agency “guidelines” (e.g. those guidelines issued by the
Department of Justice-Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission) where a good deal of the interpretation of federal antitrust
law occurs and is actually applied?
A very important additional problem arises when Wisconsin courts
must resolve state antitrust cases where federal judicial or
administrative agency decisions reflect extreme political and economic
agendas. Should the Wisconsin courts follow historic legal precedent
that is reflected in one set of decisions when it is in conflict with newly
emerging analyses? How should the Wisconsin courts handle the
hairpin turns of federal judicial and administrative decision-making that
has been rampant over the past 30 years—decisions often made by bare
majorities or plurality opinions expressing widely divergent views based
on very different economic analyses? One need only to review such
recent United States Supreme Court decisions as California Dental
52
Ass’n v. F.T.C., and Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,
53
Inc., to observe a highly contentious core conflict among the Justices of
the United States Supreme Court over traditional and practical
52. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
53. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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economic theories versus a “modern” theoretical agenda.
In California Dental Ass’n and Leegin, a bare majority of the Court
not only ignored long held legal rationales and stare decisis, but
eschewed traditional economic analyses drawn from practical economic
experience and traditional administrative law and replaced them with
theoretical arguments.
Moreover, the majority considered and
seemingly endorsed a new concept—the quick look doctrine—that had
been introduced by the federal appellate courts a little more than a
decade earlier. Yet, the Supreme Court never explained in detail the
meaning or the role of the doctrine and has not done so since California
Dental Ass’n. In Leegin, a 5–4 majority overturned an almost 100 yearold precedent [Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.] that
54
established a per se standard for vertical price-fixing. As the four
dissenters pointed out, the majority ignored the Court’s historic
reinforcement on a regular basis of the analysis in Dr. Miles that
55
explained the rationale for a per se application to vertical price-fixing.
56
Indeed, the Court had recently cited Dr. Miles and its principles (even
by some of those Supreme Court Justices now rejecting the Dr. Miles
57
principles ) as well as noted a strict standard for the doctrine of stare
58
decisis. Rather, in Leegin, the bare majority relied instead on a few
economic theories that it agreed with and only tangentially related

54. Id. at 881, 906–07.
55. Id. at 918 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
56. Nynex Corp. v. Discon, 525 U.S. 128, 133, 138 (1998); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,
11 (1997).
57. Both the Nynex and State Oil cases were decided unanimously. See sources supra
note 56.
58. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (outlining
the circumstances under which a court may overrule a previous decision). The Court
explained the importance of stare decisis as follows:
[T]he Court must accord [deference] to longstanding and well-entrenched
decisions, especially those interpreting statutes that underlie complex
regulatory regimes. Adherence to precedent is, in the usual case, a
cardinal and guiding principle of adjudication, and ‘[c]onsiderations of
stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for
here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative
power is implicated and Congress remains free to alter what we have
done.
California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 499 (1990); see also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 736 (1977) (declining to overrule an earlier decision interpreting Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, stating “considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction,
where Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation.”) (citations
omitted).
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recent prior decisions citing those same theories, but without any
59
practical support to overturn the Dr. Miles decision. Interestingly,
there has been a significant effort to get Congress to overturn the Leegin
60
decision. There have also been claims filed in the New York and other
state courts to disregard the Leegin decision when interpreting state
61
antitrust law, a dissent in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit questioning the application by the majority as to both
62
the Leegin and Twombly cases, and a rejection under California’s
Cartwright Act of part of the Leegin analysis.
Not surprisingly, the type of judicial activism that rationalized the
Leegin decision results in judgments that are far from a consensus on
both legal and economic doctrines that might light the way for state law
and courts. In addition, federal agencies involved in enforcing antitrust
law regularly interpret the meaning of antitrust federal law through
guidelines and administrative decisions that reflect the political leanings
63
of the current administration. Locked into an absolutist requirement,
59. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889–93.
60. Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 148, H.R. 3190, 111th Cong. (2009).
This bill never passed in 111th Congress; however, it has recently been proposed again in the
112th Congress in the Senate. Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 75, 112th Cong.
(2011).
61. Leegin did not directly address the status of minimum resale price maintenance
under state law. See Michael A. Lindsay, An Update on State RPM Laws Since Leegin, THE
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 29, 2010, available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/RPM_
Leegin_Lindsay_122110.pdf; see also Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Equitas Ltd., No.
600815/07 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 18, 2011); People v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., No. 400837/10
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2011); California v. Bioelements, Inc., No. 10011659 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 11, 2011) (final judgment including permanent injunction); People v. Dermaquest, Inc.
No. RG 10497526 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2010) (final judgment including permanent
injunction); Brief for the State of Kansas as Amicus Curiae, O’Brien v. Leegin Creative
Leather Prod., Inc. No. 08-1010000-S (Kan. Aug. 12, 2010). O’Brien is an undecided case on
appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court after a lower court upheld a Leegin type overruling of
prior per se decisions. See O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 04-CV- 1668
(8th Jud. Dist. Sedgwick County Kansas, July 9, 2008) direct appeal granted, File No. 101,000
(Oct. 6, 2008) (trial court opinion did not cite Leegin); see also MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAW
§ 11-204(b) (West 2009) (defining any “contract, combination, or conspiracy that establishes a
minimum price below which a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor may not sell a commodity or
service” to be an unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce); New York v. Herman Miller,
Inc., No. 08-Civ-2977 (S.D.N.Y. March 25, 2008) (stipulated final judgment and consent
decree).
62. Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1345–48 (11th Cir. 2010)
(Ryskamp, J. dissenting).
63. See generally David A. Balto, Antitrust Enforcement in the Clinton Administration, 9
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61 (1999) (examining why antitrust enforcement has become
more prominent, and in what respects current antitrust enforcement is different than that of
earlier administrations); Jonathan Rose, State Antitrust Enforcement, Mergers, and Politics, 41
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how can the Wisconsin courts apply federal judicial and administrative
decisions that are in conflict with each other or their prior guidelines
and decisions? Of course, most state court decisions will follow the
reasoned antitrust decisions by the United States Supreme Court. Still,
if state law is not preempted, is it reasonable that what was true in
Wisconsin yesterday is no longer true today because a federal judge, a
federal agency, or even the United States Supreme Court no longer
thinks it is a rational policy? For example, what happens if the 5–4
decision in Leegin is overturned and the per se doctrine in Dr. Miles is
reinstated due to Congressional action, or if Wisconsin chooses to follow
other states that have chosen not to follow the Leegin decision? Indeed,
as the doctrine of stare decisis is undone by the federal courts and
inconsistency grows in federal judicial and agency policies and rulings,
Wisconsin businesspersons and consumers, as well as their attorneys and
the Wisconsin courts, have been committed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to ride a roller coaster of politically motivated legal and economic
hairpin turns which the court’s doctrine of federal absolutism is
64
incapable of controlling.
V. WISCONSIN TREATMENT OF FEDERAL DECISIONS INVOLVING
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANTITRUST STANDARDS
Without specific direction from the state legislature, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has not veered from federal court interpretations of
federal antitrust law when addressing procedural issues in antitrust
cases. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court
held that a party alleging that it was harmed indirectly due to
anticompetitive practices (e.g. the passing on of increased prices due to
price-fixing) would not have standing to sue under federal antitrust
65
statutes in federal courts. Notably, in a subsequent case, California v.
ARC America Corp., the United States Supreme Court held that the
WAYNE L. REV. 71 (1994). For a classic example of conflicting views by federal antitrust
enforcement agencies, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE–
FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008) (withdrawn 2009) and the
response by the Federal Trade Commission, FTC Release (9/30/08). See also Editorial,
Another Thumb on the Scales, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2008, at A22; Peter Whoriskey, Justice’s
Monopoly Guidelines Assailed: Majority of FTC Says Policy Would Weaken Enforcement,
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2008, at D1.
64. Whatever the meaning of the requirement to follow federal law, the interpretation of
the federal law commandment is not ubiquitous. Although the antitrust statutes and judicial
opinions in some states direct that the statute is to be interpreted in concert with federal
judicial opinions, the Wisconsin courts have not chosen to provide for this kind of leeway.
65. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977).
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Illinois Brick decision did not bind the states in determining whether an
66
indirect purchaser could have standing to sue in a state antitrust case.
Although a Wisconsin court has held that, due to the Wisconsin
legislature’s amendment of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, indirect
67
purchaser plaintiffs have standing to sue, that court also made it clear
that the legislature addressed only those claiming the “pass-on offense”
and did not permit defendant’s to use the “pass-on defense” to claims by
68
a direct purchaser. Interestingly, a significant part of the Illinois Brick
decision to not allow indirect purchasers to have standing was based on
a concern that since the Court previously denied the use of the pass-on
defense by defendants facing possible recoveries by direct purchasers
who had passed on the costs of the anticompetitive activity to indirect
purchasers, it would be inappropriate to allow indirect purchaser
plaintiffs to have standing and thereby expose defendants to possible
69
70
multiple liabilities. Does the K-S Pharmacies decision indicate that
the Wisconsin courts are willing to forego United States Supreme Court
direction and not provide a pass-on defense as a counter balance for the
legislature’s approval of indirect purchaser actions or is the K-S
Pharmacies decision merely a strict construction of the amendment to
Wisconsin Statute section 133.18?
Although the Wisconsin legislature has enacted “indirect purchaser”
legislation that sets forth a standing requirement different than the one
set by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Brick, many other
procedural antitrust standards set by the United States Supreme Court
remain unaddressed by the Wisconsin legislature or by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. For example, in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., the Court qualified the traditional standard of
71
permissible inferences for getting past a motion for summary judgment.
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court heightened the pleading
72
requirement for federal civil cases. In Twombly, the Court required
that plaintiffs plead enough facts to make their claim plausible (rather

66. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105–06 (1989).
67. WIS. STAT. § 133.18(1)(a) (2009–2010).
68. K-S Pharmacies, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 94-002384, 1996 WL 33323859, at *11–12
(Wis. Cir. Ct. May 17, 1996); see also In Re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5
(D.D.C. 2003) (explaining that Wisconsin analyzed its antitrust statute in a manner that did
not allow a pass on defense).
69. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730.
70. K-S Pharmacies, Inc., 1996 WL 33323859, at *11–12.
71. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
72. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
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73

than possible or conceivable). Recently, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin discussed the application of
74
the Twombly standard in a diversity case. This case is emblematic of
the problems the Wisconsin courts face when considering issues decided
by federal courts sitting in diversity and addressing areas of state law
which the state courts have not yet addressed. In other words, under the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s current philosophy of the absolute binding
nature of federal decisions, can a federal court sitting in diversity bind
state law? Finally, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., the
Supreme Court established a standard for whether a jury could infer
from the termination of a price-cutting distributor in response to
complaints from other dealers that there was an illegal conspiracy in
violation of Sherman Act Section 1 through a “resale price
75
maintenance” agreement.
The Court established that to prove an
illegal conspiracy through complaints by competing dealers to a
manufacturer “something more than evidence of complaints is needed.
There must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the
manufacturer and the non-terminated distributors were acting
76
independently.” The meaning of the Court’s requirement that there
must be “evidence that tends to exclude the possibility [that the parties]
77
were acting independently” has been the subject of very different
interpretations.
Observe the dramatic difference between the
interpretations of the Monsanto standard in the Second, Fourth, and
78
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the interpretation applied in
79
the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals. In Toys R Us v.

73. Id. at 556.
74. See Westerfield v. Quiznos Franchise Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 840, 856–57 (E.D. Wis.
2007).
75. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. These cases are examples of Circuit Courts that have interpreted the language of the
Monsato standard to mean that if there is any possibility of independent action, the standard
for independent action has been met and there is no concerted action. See H.L. Hayden Co.
of New York, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1013–14 (2d Cir. 1989); Parkway
Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Grp., Inc., 878 F.2d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 1989);
Helicopter Support Sys., Inc. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530, 1532–33 (11th Cir.
1987); Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., 799 F.2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 1986) cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
79. These cases are examples of Circuit Courts that have interpreted the Monsato
standard in a fashion that allows a plaintiff to establish concerted action even when there is
some evidence of independent action. Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. 547 F.3d
266, 272–73 (5th Cir. 2008); Toys “R” Us, Inc., v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 221 F.3d 928, 934–35
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F.T.C., Judge Wood interprets the Monsanto standard as not requiring
“to exclude all possibility” that the defendants acted unilaterally but
“only that there must be some evidence which, if believed, would
80
support a finding of concerted behavior.”
Note that Judge Wood
emphasizes that if there is some evidence that tends to exclude the
possibility of independent action then collusion may be established.
A corollary issue to the procedural/substantive distinction is how the
courts of Wisconsin should address the application of the per se
81
standard. Over the past century, the United States Supreme Court has
declared some anticompetitive acts as so pernicious that the mere doing
82
of the act is illegal per se (i.e. on its face). An additional consideration
for establishing the per se standard was to provide parties and courts
with an area of predictability as to what practices are clearly
83
anticompetitive. Unfortunately, the Court’s rationale for its decision
84
to create a per se standard, modify it (e.g. the “quick look rule of
reason”), or totally retract the application of the per se standard and
substitute a full rule of reason test sometimes appears to be without
(7th Cir. 2000).
80. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 221 F.3d at 935.
81. Patti-Marshall, LLC v. Four Winds Subdivision, LLC, No. 2009AP2741, 2010 Wisc.
App. LEXIS 710, at *5–6.
82. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153–54 (1968) (holding vertical
maximum price restrictions illegal per se) overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7
(1997); U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967) (holding vertical non-price
restrictions illegal per se) overruled by Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 58
(1977); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212–14 (1959) (holding a
group boycott illegal per se); U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940)
(holding that horizontal price fixing is illegal per se); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408–09 (1911) (holding minimum resale price maintenance illegal per
se) overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007).
83. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886–87; Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
723 (1988); Nat’l Soc. of Prof. Eng’r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
84. The Supreme Court of the United States has shifted the standard of proof for some
general subject areas (e.g. horizontal agreements to fix prices or horizontal agreements to
limit output) where it had traditionally applied the per se doctrine, to a rule of reason due to
the “character” of the facts in a particular case. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984). Later, the Court redefined for some fact patterns the
breadth of the per se doctrine as it applies to concerted refusals to deal. See Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 461–62 (1986); Nw. Wholesale Stationers,
Inc. v. Pac. Stationary and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295–97 (1985). Finally, following an
appellate court decision wherein the Third Circuit identified a “quick look rule of reason”
standard, United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3rd Cir. 1993) (a standard slightly
broader than per se but less broad than the rule of reason), the United States Supreme Court
has discussed the utility of a quick look rule of reason. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed.
Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 764 (1999); see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016–19
(10th Cir. 1998); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 676 (7th Cir. 1992).
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strong support, confusing, and in certain cases appears opportunistic.
The tight reins on the ability of Wisconsin courts to selectively apply
federal decisions interpreting federal law leaves open the real possibility
that parties before the Wisconsin courts, and even the courts
themselves, may be whipsawed by rapidly shifting doctrines that find
favor (sometimes temporarily) with the United States Supreme Court,
lesser federal courts, or even federal agencies. Although Wisconsin
courts have faced numerous cases wherein the facts raised might fall
into the per se category when examined by a federal court, Wisconsin
courts have never established when an antitrust violation is illegal per se
and whether they will follow absolutely federal decisions applying the
86
per se standard.

85. See generally Leegin, 551 U.S. 877; State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Peter
Carstensen & David Hart, Khaning the Court: How the Antitrust Establishment Obtained an
Advisory Opinion Legalizing” Maximum” Price-Fixing, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 241 (2003).
86. Although the appellate court in Patti-Marshall, LLC v. Four Winds Subdivision,
LLC, No. 2009AP2741, 2010 Wisc. App. LEXIS 710, at *5–6, identified areas that might be
considered per se antitrust violations in general, the court did not discuss whether these
would be per se violations in Wisconsin. However, in most cases Wisconsin courts have
chosen not to address which anti-competitive practices are illegal per se in general much less a
per se violation in Wisconsin. In fact, the federal courts considering Wisconsin law as to what
constitutes an antitrust violation per se in Wisconsin have had difficulty discerning what
violations are illegal per se. See Slowiak v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1296 (7th Cir.
1993) (“Is maximum resale price maintenance a per se violation of Wisconsin law?”). The
Wisconsin cases (and some federal cases) where the facts involved might be violations under
the federal per se standard at the time the cases were decided are grouped below into subject
categories where the federal courts have traditionally found some of these practices to be
illegal per se:
(1) PRICE FIXING – Eichenseer v. Madison-Dane County Tavern League, Inc., 2008 WI 38,
¶ 35, 308 Wis. 2d 684, 748 N.W.2d 154, 166; Meyers v. Bayer, A.G. 2007 WI 99, ¶ 49, 303 Wis.
2d 295, 322, 735 N.W. 2d 448, 462; Patti-Marshall LLC, 2010 Wisc. App. LEXIS 710, at *5–6;
Szukalski v. Crompton Corp., 2006 WI App. 195, ¶ 3, 296 Wis. 2d 728, 730, 726 N.W. 2d 304,
306; Derzon v. Appleton Papers, No. 00-1808, 2001 Wisc. App. LEXIS 540 at *1; Derzon v.
New Oji Paper Co., No. 99-1368 2000 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1060, at *1;
(2) GROUP BOYCOTT–Fox Valley Thoracic Surgical Assocs. v. Ferrante, No. 2006AP3201,
2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 150 at *11–15;
(3) HORIZONTAL MARKET ALLOCATION and TYING ARRANGEMENTS–In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 656 (E.D. Mich. 2000);
(4) TYING ARRANGEMENTS – Westerfield v. Quiznos Franchise Co., LLC, 527 F.Supp.
2d 840, 856 (E. D. Wis. 2007); Cedarhurst Air Charter, Inc. v. Waukesha County, 110 F. Supp.
2d 891, 892–93 (E.D. Wis. 2000);
(5) RETAIL PRICE MAINTENANCE – Praefke Auto Elec. & Battery Co. v. Tecumseh
Prods. Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 889, 917 (E.D. Wis. 2000) rev’d, 255 F.3d 460, 460 (7th Cir. 2001);
Slowiak v. Hudson Foods, No. 91-C-737, WL 176983 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 8, 1992), aff’d, Slowiak
v. Land O’Lakes, 987 F.2d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1993); Scott & Fetzer Co., Kirby Co. Div. v.
Peterson, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15289, *1 (W.D. Wis. 1987) Ahmad v. Milwaukee, No. 910533, 1991 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1427 at *5 n.4 (1991); see also Indep. Milk Producers Co-op v.
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VI. WHERE IS THE STATE OF WISCONSIN TO GO FROM HERE?
To continue the requirement that Wisconsin courts interpreting the
Wisconsin Antitrust Act follow in lockstep the interpretations of federal
antitrust law by federal decisions is neither necessary nor advisable.
Unless the Wisconsin state legislature chooses to adopt a more specific
set of antitrust rules, a problematic practice for the same reasons that
the United States Congress has avoided this practice with the Sherman
Act, the Wisconsin state courts, much like the federal courts, must
evolve their own legal standards for antitrust violations. Necessarily,
this does not mean that the state courts must jettison all relationship to
the federal law. Rather, Wisconsin state court analyses of what
constitutes anticompetitive practices should examine federal doctrines
with a broader eye to the evolution of antitrust law, and forego
dogmatic application of the most recent federal decisions and
government policies where they do not fit the nature of Wisconsin’s
economic concerns and values. In so doing, the Wisconsin courts
applying the Wisconsin Antitrust Act will allow for a set of values and
interests that reflect the business and consumer communities in
Wisconsin.
As noted above, recent federal decisions that have revealed stark
conflicts in economic analysis resulting in close decisions, such as those
in California Dental Ass’n and Leegin, have increased the need for
flexibility on the part of Wisconsin courts when considering federal
interpretations of federal antitrust law. Also, the differences in
interpretation of the United States Supreme Court wording in Monsanto
87
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., brings into sharp focus the problems
the Wisconsin courts will face if they continue to follow a policy of
doggedly following federal decisions. A further problem arises when
the Wisconsin courts must address not only the vague language in
Monsanto, but also must consider whether they are bound by federal
district and circuit court decisions within their own circuit or should
consider decisions by “foreign” district and appellate courts. Worse still,
can federal court decisions in diversity cases where the Wisconsin courts
have not spoken bind the state courts under the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s federal decision policy? Ultimately, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s failure to provide a priority structure among the decisions by the
federal courts as well as the federal agency decisions and guidelines has
left Wisconsin antitrust law with very little guidance.
Stoffel, 102 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 298 N.W.2d 102, 106 (Ct. App. 1980).
87. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
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Many other states, through legislative action or judicial application,
are less tethered to federal court interpretations of antitrust law (in
announced policy even if not always in practice). Because the
legislatures and courts of many states have opted to be “guided” by
federal decisions rather than follow a lockstep approach, these courts
have assured their citizenry of both an opportunity to deviate from what
they believe are federal decisions inappropriately applying antitrust
doctrine and to look to sister state courts for a commonality of
interpretation. With greater freedom the Wisconsin courts may
sometimes choose to follow other states rather than federal decisions
interpreting federal antitrust law.
Finally, some states have taken a more progressive stance. In
particular, the Vermont antitrust (and trade) law is patterned after the
88
Federal Trade Commission Act. The leeway the Act gives the state
and its courts is much greater than the “Little Sherman Acts,” yet allows
the principles that are embodied in the Sherman Act to continue to play
a significant part in the state antitrust law. Other states have followed
the Little Sherman Act model but provided their own “spin,” giving
courts greater independence without sacrificing the Sherman Act
89
language and application (e.g. California’s Cartwright Act).
Instead of being whipsawed by the hairpin turns of federal judicial
policy, Wisconsin should develop its own interpretations of antitrust law
where warranted and meet state interests and concerns. Unfortunately,
by failing to follow an independent state policy over the past century,
Wisconsin has foregone the natural development of state antitrust law.
If the Wisconsin Supreme Court could develop an independent voice it
could not only reflect state values and interests but return to its
historical role as a leader in national economic thinking.

88. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2451 (2010).
89. See, e.g., Cartwright Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 2010).

